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WSU Lexicon: Derivatives
A clearinghouse is the central counterparty that steps between buyer and seller once a derivatives trade is agreed, becoming buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer. It guarantees performance by collecting initial and variation margin and marking open positions to market daily.
Standard for exchange-traded futures; since post-2008 reform, also for most standardised OTC swaps.
The entry
The economic substance of clearing is novation. Once a bilateral trade is matched and accepted for clearing, the original contract between the two counterparties is legally extinguished and replaced by two contracts, each facing the clearinghouse. Neither party retains any claim on the other; each now has an obligation to, and a claim against, the central counterparty alone.
This has three consequences a candidate should be able to state. Credit assessment collapses to a single name: participants need only evaluate the clearinghouse and their own clearing member. Contracts become fungible, so a long futures position can be closed by selling an identical contract to anyone, since both legs face the same counterparty and net to zero. And exposures across a member's book can be netted, dramatically reducing the gross notional that must actually be settled.
The entry
Initial margin is a performance bond sized to cover the expected worst-case move in a position over the period required to close it out, typically estimated from historical or simulated price distributions at a high confidence level. It is posted at trade inception and returned when the position is closed, adjusted for gains and losses.
Variation margin is the settlement of the day's price change. At the end of each session the clearinghouse sets an official settlement price and marks every open position to it. Accounts with losses pay cash into the clearinghouse; accounts with gains receive it. Because the clearinghouse's book is flat by construction, the payments net exactly. If an account's balance falls below the maintenance margin level, a margin call requires the holder to restore the balance to the initial margin level, not merely to the maintenance threshold. Failure to meet the call permits the position to be liquidated.
The entry
All exchange-traded derivatives, futures and listed options, clear through an affiliated clearinghouse; clearing is what makes the standardised contract tradable at all. In over-the-counter markets, the picture changed after 2008. Regulatory reforms in the United States and Europe mandated central clearing for standardised interest rate swaps and index credit default swaps, pushing a large share of a formerly bilateral market onto central counterparties such as LCH SwapClear and ICE Clear Credit.
Access is tiered. Only clearing members face the clearinghouse directly; end users clear indirectly through a member, who guarantees the client's obligations and holds client collateral in segregated accounts. Non-cleared OTC derivatives remain, and are now subject to bilateral margin requirements designed to remove the collateral advantage of avoiding clearing.
The entry
Be able to explain novation and its effect on counterparty credit exposure, distinguish initial from variation margin by purpose and timing, and compute an account's balance across several trading days including the point at which a maintenance margin breach triggers a call and the amount required to cure it. Futures margin questions are frequently arithmetic exercises disguised as concept questions.
Equally testable is the contrast between cleared and non-cleared instruments. Forwards are customised, bilateral and settled at maturity, so credit exposure accumulates over the contract's life; futures are standardised and marked daily, so exposure is reset each session. Recognise also that clearing transforms credit risk rather than deleting it: what remains is concentrated exposure to the central counterparty itself, plus a daily liquidity demand for cash variation margin that can bind precisely when markets are stressed.
Common trap
Clearing transforms and concentrates counterparty risk rather than erasing it. Members still face the clearinghouse itself, which is protected only by margin, a default fund and a loss waterfall. A failure of a large member, or of the CCP, remains a systemic tail risk.
In practice
When Lehman Brothers defaulted, LCH.Clearnet's SwapClear held a vast interest rate swap portfolio for the firm. It hedged the book and auctioned the positions to surviving members, absorbing the losses within the initial margin Lehman had posted.
Candidates ask
See also
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