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WSU Lexicon: Ethical and Professional Standards
Material nonpublic information is information that would likely affect a security's price, or that a reasonable investor would want before trading, and that has not yet been broadly disseminated to the market. Members possessing it must not act on it or cause others to act.
Standard II(A) governs its use; issuer-side selective disclosure is separately restricted under Regulation FD.
The entry
Applying the standard requires two separate judgments. Materiality turns on whether the information would plausibly move the price of a security or influence a reasonable investor's decision to buy, sell or hold. Specificity, magnitude and reliability all raise the materiality of a piece of information; vague market chatter, sector commentary or an analyst's opinion generally does not qualify. For contingent events such as merger negotiations or drug-trial outcomes, materiality is assessed by weighing the probability that the event occurs against the size of its likely price impact.
The second judgment concerns dissemination. Information becomes public only when it has been released through channels available to the investing public at large, such as a regulatory filing, a press release carried by a news wire, or a broadly accessible earnings call, and the market has had a reasonable opportunity to absorb it. Disclosure to a select group of analysts or large holders is not dissemination. Where either test is genuinely ambiguous, the prudent course is to treat the information as restricted and escalate it.
The entry
The obligation attaches to possession, not to the manner of acquisition. A member who obtains price-sensitive, undisseminated information through a breach of duty by an insider, through an inadvertent leak, or through a lawful conversation that strayed into forbidden territory is equally barred from trading on it. The prohibition extends to trading for clients and proprietary accounts, to recommending the security, and to passing the information to anyone who might act on it, including colleagues, family members and other clients.
The expected response is procedural: stop, avoid further use or circulation, and report the matter promptly to compliance or supervisory personnel so the security can be restricted and the firm can determine whether it must encourage public disclosure by the issuer. Quietly declining to trade while allowing the information to circulate internally is not sufficient. Selectively liquidating an existing position is itself a use of the information and is prohibited.
The entry
Firms with both advisory and investment functions manage this exposure through information barriers: physical and electronic separation of deal teams from research and portfolio management, documented need-to-know access, review of interdepartmental communication, and personal trading pre-clearance. Compliance typically maintains a watch list of securities under confidential monitoring and a restricted list that blocks proprietary and client trading, and often research publication, in named names.
The practical friction appears in analyst work. Issuer management meetings, expert-network calls, channel checks and conversations with suppliers are legitimate research, but each can produce information the speaker was not entitled to share. Selective disclosure rules such as Regulation Fair Disclosure in the United States require issuers to correct such slips publicly, yet the analyst's own duty does not depend on the issuer complying. Documenting the sources behind a recommendation is the practical defense when an inference is later questioned.
The entry
Examination items are typically short vignettes in which a member learns something through a golf-course remark, an overheard elevator conversation, a misdirected email, a friend at a supplier, or a consulting arrangement, and then must choose between trading, tipping, publishing, or reporting. The reliable approach is to name the information, ask whether a reasonable investor would want it before trading, ask whether it has reached the broad market, and then select the response that neither uses nor spreads it while bringing it to compliance.
Candidates should also distinguish this standard from adjacent ones. Legitimate analysis of public data, including proprietary models and conclusions that no one else has reached, is protected research. Encouraging the issuer to publish the information, rather than trading ahead of it, is the constructive remedy. Where local law is more permissive than the professional standard, the stricter obligation governs conduct.
Common trap
Possession, not the method of acquisition, triggers the prohibition. Standard II(A) bars acting or causing others to act on material nonpublic information however it reaches you. The correct response is to refrain from trading and urge public disclosure.
In practice
Hedge fund founder Raj Rajaratnam was convicted in 2011 of securities fraud and conspiracy for trading on tips from corporate insiders and consultants, including information about Goldman Sachs. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison.
Candidates ask
See also
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